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The Connection between the Best Possible 
World and the Monadic Realm
Abstract
In this paper, I claim that in Leibniz’s metaphysics, we can use the notion of world in a two-
fold sense; on the one hand, to refer to highly complex divine thoughts, i.e. the ideal realm, 
and on the other hand, to refer to a network of living substances with their perceptions 
and appetitions, i.e. the substantial realm. Firstly, I will clarify the ideal realm in Leibniz’s 
metaphysics, which consists of three combinatorial levels about the fundamental entities, 
namely the simple ideas in God’s mind: complex ideas, complete individual notions and 
possible worlds. The second part is about the individual substances, i.e. the monads. In the 
third section, finally, I will discuss different ways to think about the connection between the 




















Cf.	Benson	Mates,	The philosophy of Leib-

















al	 substances.	And	 the	 third	 level	depends	ontologically	on	 the	 substances	













































but	 that	 all	 the	 ideas,	which	God	 thinks,	 result	 from	God’s	 perfections	 or	





















niz,	New essays on Human Understanding,	
edited	 and	 translated	 by	 Peter	 Remnant	 and	






















C’est	 parce	 que	 l’Entendement	 de	 Dieu	 est	
la	Region	des	verités	éternelles,	ou	des	idées	
dont	elles	dependent,	et	que	sans	lui	il	n’y	au-





summa rerum: metaphysical papers, 1675–
1676,	translated	by	G.	H.	R.	Parkinson,	Yale	
University	Press,	New	Haven	–	London	1992;	






sive	 perfectionum	 possibilium	 conjunctione	
in	 eodem	 subjecto	 fit	 Ens	 perfectissimum;	
ex	conjunctione	autem	formarum	simplicium	











Samuel	 Newlands,	 “Leibniz	 on	 the	 Ground	
of	 Possibility”,	 philosophical Review	 122	
















ties	resulting	from	essences.	 In	other	words,	essences	are	 logically	prior	 to	
properties,	and	divine	forms	or	perfections	are	prior	to	divine	ideas.	Hence,	it	
seems	adequate	to	understand	ideas	as	grounded	in	perfections.11	And	there	



















Before	we	go	 into	more	detail,	 I	would	 like	 to	highlight	 that	 it	 seems	 that	
combination	requires	operations:	conjunction,	at	least.	To	combine	is	always	
understood	as	conjoining	something	with	something	distinct.	The	idea	of	a	





whole	 story,	 then	Leibniz’s	 theory	of	modality	would	be	 indistinguishable	








number	of	simple	 ideas	 is	combined	by	 the	divine	mind	 to	complex	 ideas,	
according	to	the	PC.	If	the	combination	is	brought	from	the	domain	of	finite,	
to	the	domain	of	infinite-complex	structures,	then	Leibniz	reaches	the	second	
level	of	 the	ars combinatoria:	 the	complete	 individual	notions.	 In	 the	Dis-











monad	or	substance	sub ratione possibilitatis is	represented	in	the	divine	mind	
by	its	complete	individual	notion.20	The	passage	from	the	Discourse empha-













tween	 divine	 perfections	 and	 divine	 ideas,	
please	 see:	 Massimo	 Mugnai,	 “Leibniz’s	
Nominalism	 and	 the	 Reality	 of	 Ideas	 in	 the	
Mind	of	God”,	in:	Albert	Heinekamp,	Wolf-
gang	Lenzen,	Martin	Schneider	(eds.),	Math-
esis rationis. Festschrift für Heinrich Schep-
ers,	Nodus	Publikationen,	Münster	1990,	pp.	
153–167;	 Robert	 Merrihew	 Adams,	 “God,	
Possibility,	and	Kant”,	Faith and philosophy	
17	 (2000)	 4,	 pp.	 425–440,	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.5840/faithphil200017439;	Ohad	Nach-
tomy,	possibility, Agency, and Individuality 
in Leibniz’s Metaphysics,	Springer,	Dordrecht	
2007,	pp.	24–27;	Sebastian	Bender,	Leibniz’ 





Yual	 Chiek	 (eds.),	Leibniz on Compossibil-







A	quality	 is	 simple,	 if	 it	 is	 not	 reducible	 to	
more	simple	qualities,	 like	 the	quality	being 
human	 is	 reducible	 to	 the	more	basic	 quali-















the	 Source	 of	 Incompossibility	 in	 Leibniz’s	
Paris	Notes	and	Some	Remarks	on	Time	and	
Space	as	Packing	Constraints”,	in:	G.	Brown,	













term	 ‘prior’	has	only	a	 logical	 and	not	 tem-
poral	meaning.
20




For	 example,	 in	 Leibniz’s	 primary Truths 
from 1686 or 1689,	 cf.	 C,	 pp.	 518–523.	 C	
=	 Gottfried	 Wilhelm	 Leibniz,	Opuscules et 
fragments inédits,	 edited	 by	 L.	 Couturat,	 F.	
Alcan,	Paris	1903.
22
Translation	 from	 R.	 M.	 Adams,	 Leibniz,	 p.	
31;	A	6.4/B,	p.	1600.	Original	text:	“…	quia	
de	natura	substantiae	individualis	est,	ut	notio	
ejus	 sit	 perfecta	 atque	 completa,	 omnesque	


















notion	 of	 x.	Certainly,	UED	 is	 in	 conflict	with	 another	 central	 doctrine	 of	
Leibniz’s	metaphysics:	with	 the	World-Apart Doctrine	 (WAD).	In	 the	Dis-







is	 defused	 by	 reducing	 relations	 to	 predicates,	which	 ground	 relations.	As	










A	relation	 is,	 in	 fact,	a	 relational	 idea	of	a	complete	 individual	notion.	Peter	























Within	 current	 debates	 about	 the	 interpretation	 of	 compossibility	 there	 are	










ing	the	complex	idea	the first man.	According	to	the	Logical Interpretation 






ou	 bien	 de	 tout	 l’univers,	 qu’elle	 exprime	
chacune	à	sa	façon	(…).”
24
Nicholas	 Rescher,	 Leibniz. An Introduction 
to his philosophy,	 Basil	 Blackwell,	 Oxford	
1979,	p.	50.
25
This	 notion	 is	 used,	 for	 example,	 in	 Ja-
mes	 Messina,	 Donald	 Rutherford,	 “Leib-
niz	 on	 Compossibility”,	 philosophy Com-
pass 4	 (2009)	 6,	 pp.	 962–977,	 p.	 975,	
footnote	 9,	 doi:	 https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1747-9991.2009.00262.x;	 A	 6.4,	 p.	 964;	
Sebastian	 Bender,	 “On	 Worlds,	 Laws	 and	
Tiles:	Leibniz	and	the	Problem	of	Compossi-
bility”,	in:	G.	Brown,	Y.	Chiek	(ed.),	Leibniz 
on Compossibility and possible Worlds,	 pp.	
65–90,	 69;	 Yual	 Chieck,	 “Compossibility	
and	Co-possibility”,	in:	G.	Brown,	Y.	Chiek	
(ed.),	Leibniz on Compossibility and possible 
Worlds,	pp.	91–124.
26








relational	 properties.	 This	 position	 has	 an	
immediate	 influence	on	other	 related	 topics,	
like	 transworld	 identity,	 superessentialism,	
etc.	Cf.	Jan	Cover,	John	O’Leary	Hawthorne,	
“Leibnizian	Essentialism,	Transworld	Identi-
ty,	and	Counterparts”,	History of philosophy 
Quarterly	9	(1992)	4,	pp.	425–444.
29
Both	 interpretations	 were	 characterized	 by	
Fred	D’Agostino,	by	the	labels	Analytic	and	
Synthetic Interpretation.	Cf.	Fred	D’Agostino,	
“Leibniz	 on	 Compossibility	 and	 Relational	
Predicates”,	 philosophical Quarterly 26	
(1976)	 103,	 pp.	 125–138,	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.2307/2219130.	 There	 are	 some	 other	
interpretations	 of	 compossibility,	 which	 are	
more	 or	 less	 modifications	 of	 the	 two	 para-
digmatic	 strategies,	 like	 the	 Cosmological 
Interpretation by	Messina	and	Rutherford	(cf.	
J.	Messina,	D.	Rutherford,	“Leibniz	on	Com-
possibility”),	 or	 Wilson’s	 Logical/Lawful 
Hybrid Interpretation	 (cf.	Margaret	Wilson,	
“Compossibility	and	Law”,	in:	Steven	Nadler	
(ed.),	Causation in early Modern philosophy,	





























Secondly,	 the	Logical Interpretation seems	 to	be	 incompatible	with	WAD,	
because	 this	 interpretation	 entails	 that	 every	 complete	 individual	 notion	 is	


























the	 Lawful Interpretation seems	 to	 depend	 on	 the	 PSR.	 According	 to	 the	
former	 interpretation,	 a	possible	world	 is	 a	 compossible	 sequence	of	 com-
plete	individual	notions	with	all	their	monadic	(i.e.	their	intrinsic	ideas)	and	
relational	 ideas,	which	 do	 not	 involve	 any	 contradiction,	 therefore	 the	 PC	

















2. The Monadic Realm
In	 the	previous	chapter,	 the	examined	cases	referred	to	entities	sub ratione 
possibilitatis,	which	are	all	part	of	an	 immense	combinatorial	“procedure”,	




















osophical papers and Letters,	 edited	 and	
translated	 by	 L.	 E.	 Loemker,	 2nd	 ed.,	 Rei-
del,	 Dordrecht-Boston	 1969.	 Original	 text:	
“Si	Monades	 omnes	 ex	 propria	 penu,	 ut	 sic	
loquar,	 et	 sine	 ullo	 physico	 unius	 in	 aliam	
influxu	 perceptiones	 suas	 habent,	 si	 praete-
rea	cujuslibet	Monadis	perceptiones	caeteris	









Cf.	B.	Mates,	The philosophy of Leibniz,	p.	192.
35
For	 example,	 Ian	 Hacking,	 “A	 Leibnizian	
Theory	of	Truth”,	 in:	Michael	Hooker	 (ed.),	
Leibniz. Critical and Interpretative essays,	
University	 of	Minnesota	 Press,	Minneapolis	
1982,	pp.	185–195;	Jan	Cover,	John	O’Leary	
Hawthorne,	 Substance and Individuation in 


























of	 correspondence	between	 substances	or	monads	 and	complete	 individual	
notions.	Before	going	into	this	one-to-one	relation,	let	us	clarify	what	Leibniz	
understands	by	the	term	monad.


















































3. The Connection between 
  the Ideal and the Monadic Realm
As	 previously	 discussed,	 all	 monads	 are	 in	 some	way	 linked	 to	 complete	
individual	notions.46	Hence,	all	monads	have	corresponding	complete	 indi-





notion	and	a	monad,	that	is,	between	the	status	sub ratione possibilitatis and	
actual	existence?	In	De Natura Veritatis, Contingentiae et Indifferentiae	from	
the	1680’s,	Leibniz	says:












sensus]	 or	 identity	 in	 variety;	 you	 can	 even	
say	 that	 it	 is	 the	degree	of	 contemplatibility	
[considerabilitas].	 Indeed,	 order,	 regularity,	
and	harmony	come	to	the	same	thing.”	–	Ar-
iew/Garber,	p.	233–234;	LW,	p.	172	(LW	=	
Gottfried	 Wilhlem	 Leibniz,	 Briefwechsel 














–	 Donald	 Rutherford,	 “The	 Actual	World”,	
in:	 Maria	 Rosa	 Antognazza	 (ed.),	 The Ox-
ford Handbook of Leibniz,	Oxford	University	
Press,	Oxford	2018,	pp.	65–85,	p.	76.
43















image	 of	 God,	 therefore,	 every	 substance	
does	not	only	mirror	the	universe	but	the	de-
ity	too.	Cf.	Edward	Craig,	Mind of God and 
the Works of Man,	Oxford	University	Press,	
Oxford	1987.
45




Cf.	 Hans	 Poser,	 Leibniz’ philosophie. Über 
die einheit von Metaphysik und Wissenschaft,	













































ity	and	their	 intrinsic	perfections.	However,	 in	 the	end,	 there	is	a	sequence	
of	compossible	possibles,	which	is	the	perfect	sequence	of	possibles,	which	



























the	 perfect	 sequence	 of	 compossible	 possibles.	 In	 some	 sense,	God	has	 to	
evaluate	in	respect	to	his	tendencies	what	compossible	sequence	of	possibles	
is	worthy	of	being	created.	What	the	sequence	“looks	like”	does	not	depend	
on	his	 tendencies,	 but	what	 sequence	 is	 actualised	depends	only	on	God’s	












because,	 according	 to	 Leibniz’s	 Divine 
Conceptualism, in	 some	 sense	 the	 ideas	 are	
alive	 because	 they	 are	 identical	 with	 divine	
thoughts.
49
Linda	 Zagzebski,	 “Individual	 Essence	 and	
the	Creation”,	 in:	 Thomas	Morris	 (ed.),	Di-




David	 Blumenfeld,	 “Leibniz’s	 Theory	 of	
the	 Striving	 Possibles”,	 Studia Leibnitiana 
5	(1973),	pp.	163–177;	Arthur	Lovejoy,	The 

















Original	 text:	 “L’on	 peut	 dire	 qu’aussitost	
que	Dieu	 a	decerné	de	 créer	quelque	 chose,	
il	y	a	un	combat	entre	tous	les	possibles,	tous	
























3.2. Creation out of Nothing and Divine Preservation
Since	the	possibles	cannot	bring	themselves	into	existence,	their	actual	exist-
ence	requires	an	external	source.	Leibniz	anticipated	Blumenfeld’s	and	Love-
joy’s	hypotheses	when	he	emphasises	in	Monadology and	in	principles of Na-






































of	 a	 compossible	 sequence	 on	 possibles	 “is	 full	 of	 life”	 (Ariew/Garber,	 p.	
207;	GP	VI,	p.	598).64
It	follows	from	God’s	timelessness	(cf.	C,	p.	76)	and	Leibniz’s	theory	of	the	












then	 in	 every	moment	 the	 creation	 is	 created	 in	 the	very	 same	eternal	 act.	
From	God’s	eternal	perspective	(and	for	Leibniz	as	a	theist	this	perspective	








infinite	number	of	 living	beings,	all	connected	to	 their	complete	 individual	
notions	in	God’s	mind,	like	a	particular	being	is	connected	to	its	essence.
57
Original	 text:	 “Les	 Monades,	 n’ayant	 point	















refer	 to:	E.	Craig,	The Mind of God and the 
Works of Man.
60
Donald	 Rutherford,	 The Rational Order of 
















D.	Rutherford,	The Rational Order of Nature,	
p.	179.
63








Leibniz’ Metaphysik. ein formaler Zugang,	

















Cf.	Aloys	Pichler,	Die Theologie des Leibniz aus 





inferieure,	 qu’un	 ange	 pent	 produire;	 car	 il	




















Veza između najboljeg mogućeg svijeta i monadne domene
Sažetak
U ovom radu tvrdim da u Leibnizovoj metafizici možemo koristiti pojam svijet na dva načina. 
U jednu ruku, tako što se referiramo na visoko kompleksne božanske misli, odnosno na idealnu 
domenu, a u drugu ruku, za referiranje na mrežu živih supstancija s pripadnim percepcijama 
i stremljenjima, odnosno na supstancijalnu domenu. Najprije, pojasnit ću idealnu domenu u 
Leibnizovoj metafizici, koja se sastoji od tri kombinatorne razine o temeljnim entitetima, tj. od 
jednostavnih ideja u Božjem umu: kompleksne ideje, potpuni individualni pojmovi i mogući 
svjetovi. Drugi dio bavi se individualnim supstancijama, odnosno monadama. U trećem, konač-






Das Verhältnis zwischen der bestmöglichen Welt und dem Monadenreich
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Beitrag unterstelle ich der Leibniz’schen philosophie eine zweifache Verwendung des 
Welt-Begriffes. Auf der einen Seite kann der Begriff Welt auf hochkomplexe göttliche Gedanken, 
also den ideellen Bereich in Leibniz’ Metaphysik, bezogen werden. Auf der anderen Seite kann 
als Welt der Bereich des lebendigen Seienden, also der individuellen Substanzen und Mona-
den, bezeichnet werden. Zunächst werde ich den ideellen Bereich, welcher bei Leibniz aus drei 
durch Kombinationen gebildeten Bereichen besteht, erläutern: Dies sind zunächst die einfachen 
Ideen, dann die komplexen Ideen, die vollständigen Begriffe und schließlich die möglichen 
Welten. Anschließend wird der Fokus auf die Monaden und ihre perzeptionen und Appetitionen 
gerichtet, bevor in einem letzten Schritt die Verknüpfung beider Bereiche – des ideellen und des 







Les mondes de Leibniz
La relation entre le meilleur monde possible et le royaume des Monades
Résumé
Mon travail entend éclairer le phénomène de double application du concept de monde qui 
traverse la philosophie leibnizienne. Ce concept peut en effet désigner à la fois les pensées 
divines hautement complexes (le domaine idéel dans la métaphysique de Leibniz) et le domaine 
des êtres vivants, c’est à dire des substances individuelles et des monades. Je vais d’abord 
développer le domaine idéel qui se laisse structurer en trois dimensions formées par combi-
nassions : les idées simples, les idées complexes, les notions complètes et enfin les mondes 
possibles. puis je mettrai le focus sur les monades et leurs perceptions et appétitions. Il faudra 
dans un dernier temps mettre en lumière les connexions qu’entretiennent le domaine des idées 
et celui des monades.
Mots-clés
Gottfried	Wilhelm	Leibniz,	meilleur	monde	possible,	monde	actuel,	monade
